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 Let us return to Frank, bent over his Excel spreadsheets (see  Chapter 5 ). If  human-
itarian quantification could be condensed into legal categories, his task would have 
been easy enough. Since it is not possible, from an international law perspective, 
to be a “refugee,” an “asylum seeker,” an “internally displaced person,” a “third-
country national,” and part of  the “host population” all at the same time, these 
numbers would add up well. In such a configuration, the “humanitarian caseload” 
would be presented as a summary of  watertight categories. If  needs were summa-
rized according to legal status, UNHCR could produce the ensemble of  necessary 
figures practically on its own, or with IOM, and Frank’s work, as well as that of  
the OCHA, would be superfluous. 
 But the humanitarian gaze is not restricted to a legal point of  view. There was 
a broad range of  actors involved in humanitarian work in Cameroon: At least 
6 ministries, 11 donors, 12 UN agencies, and 49 different NGOs, and they had 
different – and often conflictual – point of  views. Every week, hundreds of  pages 
accumulated on Frank’s desk: Reports, bulletins, and notes about projects ranging 
from food distribution to malaria treatment, from shelter construction to the orga-
nization of  health clinics and field hospitals. Even if  the reports resembled one 
another in their prose, peppered with Anglicisms, and their pronounced taste for 
unpronounceable acronyms, they raised different issues. Many types of  knowledge 
beyond the legal lens were mobilized: Medical, economic, logistic, pedagogical, 
etc. In order to counterbalance the weight of  UNHCR, OCHA tried to empha-
size other ways of  looking at needs, by constructing the composite category of  
“vulnerability.” For OCHA, presenting a vision of  an ensemble of  needs allowed 
them to construct a “common advocacy” from all the agencies and NGOs, despite 
internal differences. OCHA wanted to enable common communication when it 
came to donors, politics, and the wider public, as well as common programming 
for projects (allocation of  funds and project follow-up), just as for aid evaluation. 1 
The international metric of  needs thus acted as a strategic element to maintain a 
semblance of  cohesion in the humanitarian arena, to fabricate a “consensus” in 
the competitive field of  aid. 
 This chapter follows first (in sections 1 and 2) the production of  statistics on 
the “vulnerability” of  populations, the statistics of  children suffering from acute 
malnutrition. This indicator was chosen here because it makes up part of  one 
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Vulnerability: Impartial algorithms and analog malnutrition 213
of  the least-contested aid figures: First, because undernourished children have 
long constituted one of  the privileged targets of  humanitarian aid, 2 and second, 
because malnutrition statistics are considered, for technical reasons, some of  the 
most robust in emergency situations. The allocation of  resources through humani-
tarian agencies clearly shows that the categories of  “refugees” and “malnourished 
children” are considered to rank among the most legitimate targets of  humanitar-
ian aid. In Cameroon, the UN’s humanitarian aid did not target  all people classi-
fied as “in need.” Less than half  of  “people in need” were in fact assisted by the 
agencies (1.1 million people targeted out of  2.7 million total). However, certain 
categories were fully targeted: That was the case for refugees and children under 
five years of  age with acute malnutrition. 3 
 Once the statistics of  acute malnutrition are established, I analyze the role of  
this knowledge in the construction of  a consensus in the heart of  the humanitar-
ian field. As the concept of  consensus was presented in  Chapter 4 , we shall see 
here how Frank and his software produced a map of  “vulnerability” that recon-
ciled the different data derived simultaneously from legal statutes, medical data, 
economic analysis, etc. We shall see that the software program played a crucial 
role, instructed by an algorithm, to confer order to the humanitarian field. The 
informational tool thus plays a role that is far from that which the literature on the 
“data revolution” would like to ascribe to it. While only being the last link in a long 
and eclectic figure-production chain, Frank’s algorithm was tasked with rendering 
the heterogenous data equivalent. However, it is questionable whether it makes 
needs assessment more “transparent,” as only a few people truly understand what 
the algorithm does to the data. 
 Needs through the lens of  vulnerability (1): Counting 
the malnourished 
 In Cameroon, hunger has only recently – in the past decade or so – become a 
subject of  study. 4 Unlike the other countries in the region, Cameroon has not 
been seen as a country of  hunger. 5 Before the 1990s, the principal numbers had 
to do with agricultural production (for example, the food production index) and 
were produced by the Ministry of  Agriculture (and the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization, FAO). There were some surveys on living standards at the beginning 
of  the 1960s (budgets and household consumption, especially in terms of  food), 6 
as well as the first national survey about nutrition in 1978, 7 but they remained 
sporadic. It was not until the 1990s that systematic surveys were put in place: First, 
consumption surveys according to households (ECAM – Cameroonian House-
hold Survey: 1996, 2001) 8 conducted by the Ministry of  the Economy 9 which 
included a component on food consumption; second, surveys on demographics 
and health conducted by the Ministry of  Economy and the Ministry of  Public 
Health (EDS – Demographic and Health Surveys: 1991, 1998, 2004). These sur-
veys were notably informative about food consumption in households and the rate 
of  chronic malnutrition (stunted growth). 10 The surveys showed that there were 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































216 Vulnerability: Impartial algorithms and analog malnutrition
(the benchmark population), one in four children suffered from chronic malnutri-
tion in 1991, rising to one in three in 2004. 11 These surveys also strongly indicate 
the rates of  acute malnutrition – around 5% – with large regional disparities. 
 Starting in 2006, a succession of  crises attracted the attention of  public authori-
ties to the problem of  hunger. One expert reported that “In 2006, there was noth-
ing about malnutrition in Cameroon.” 12 The Sahelian food crisis of  2005 struck 
the North and Far North regions of  Cameroon. The Cameroonian government 
therefore implemented a “National Policy on Food Security and Nutrition” and 
UNICEF produced the first situational analysis of  the mechanism of  care for 
acute malnutrition. In 2007, the massive arrival of  refugees from CAR led to 
localized studies on the Eastern region – notably, a survey by MSF on the mal-
nutrition of  refugees. The government put an Integrated Management of  Acute 
Malnutrition Programme (PCIMA) in place. In 2008, so-called “hunger riots” 
affected Yaoundé and Douala, cities until then considered spared from the food 
crises. 13 The government decided to implement a National Food Security Pro-
gram. In 2010, a new food crisis affected the Sahelian region of  Cameroon, and 
the government decided to update its national protocol for handling malnutrition. 
Within a few years, hunger had become an object of  public interest. 
 Two kinds of  surveys focused on “crisis” 14 situations: First, these were food 
security surveys, which evaluated agricultural production and market evolution 
(grain prices, for example), as well as families’ capacity to respond (vulnerability). 
The most important of  these surveys, the Comprehensive Food Security and Vul-
nerability Analysis (CFSVA), was led by the Ministry of  Agriculture, with techni-
cal support from the FAO and WFP. 15 
 Second, there were also surveys on acute malnutrition, for which we can dis-
tinguish three types of  figures: a) figures produced in the framework of  timely 
surveys, organized by humanitarian organizations to respond to a precise question 
on a place and at a given time (for example, the nutritional survey performed by 
MSF/Epicentre at Garoua Boulai in May 2014); b) figures on active screening and 
admission to nutritional health programs: They dealt with the number of  children 
currently in care (for example, the number of  children in ambulatory nutrition 
centers and nutritional therapeutic centers); 16 and c) the surveys about nutritional 
health “monitoring”: Dealing with the nutritional elements of  the Demographic 
and Health Surveys (EDS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), and 
annual nutritional surveys (SMART). All of  these surveys were led by the Ministry 
of  Public Health with the technical expertise of  UNICEF. In 2014–2016, it was 
the SMART ( Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of  Relief  and Transitions ) survey 
that produced the most robust numbers on acute malnutrition in Cameroon .17 
This survey produced two figures each year: The prevalence of  acute malnutrition 
and infant mortality. UNICEF’s SMART survey was, however, uniquely interested 
in Cameroonians. The nutritional status of  refugees was studied separately, in the 
framework of  the SENS surveys led by UNHCR (yearly in principle, but irregu-
larly in practice). 
 The reports that accumulated between 2011 and 2017 thus painted the picture 
of  a double nutritional crisis: One found in two large areas a high preponderance 
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of  severe acute malnutrition, going from 1 to 3% (the emergency threshold being 
2%): First, in northern Cameroon (the North and Far North regions), because of  
the droughts and floods which began in 2011, and the war between Boko Haram 
and the Cameroonian army starting in 2014; second, in the east of  Cameroon 
(East and Adamawa regions) with the arrival of  Central African refugees. 
 The principal objective of  the SMART survey was to calculate a rate of  acute 
malnutrition in children under five years old, 18 concentrating on four regions: 
East Cameroon, Adamawa, the North, and the Far North. It was carried out 
under the direction of  the Ministry of  Public Health by a technical expert from 
UNICEF. 19 The UNICEF coordinator was accompanied by about 40 surveyors – 
agents from the Ministry of  Public Health, nurses, and students, all trained in 
the specific methods of  the survey. 20 These surveyors were hired for the duration 
of  the survey (three weeks) and were organized in small teams of  four people: 
One supervisor (the most experienced, charged with verifying the data); one team 
leader (required to conduct the interviews, and, throughout, master the vernacu-
lar languages of  the surveyed persons); 21 one analyzer; and one assistant analyzer 
(responsible for taking anthropometric measurements). 22 
 The first stage consisted of  selecting those to be surveyed. The sample size had 
to be estimated. This estimation was made while considering the expected preva-
lence of  malnutrition and the level of  precision desired in the survey. 23 Thus, to 
estimate rates of  acute malnutrition in Adamawa, it was calculated that one had 
to measure 337 children under five years old. To find these children, how many 
families needed to be visited? 24 As a function of  the average size of  households 
in the region (5.4% per household, on average) and the percentage of  the target 
population (children under five constitute 19.2% of  households), the team esti-
mated the number of  households to visit to find the required number of  children 
and added a 10% margin of  error to be sure of  having a sufficient number in the 
case of  no responses. They chose to visit at least 402 households. 25 
 To ensure that the survey was representative, it was necessary for each house-
hold in the chosen region to have absolutely the same statistical chances to be 
surveyed. The simplest thing would have been to draw the households at ran-
dom from an exhaustive list in Adamawa. But of  course, such a list did not exist. 
Therefore, one had to move on to the cluster sampling technique – two-stage 
drawing: First, the population as a whole was split up into small geographical sec-
tors, villages (the term “census zone” ( zone de dénombrement ) was used) where there 
was already a population estimate available .26 To find 402 households, how many 
villages did they have to visit? Thanks to the population figures – Adamawa is a 
region of  a little over 1.2 million inhabitants – it was estimated that 25 villages 
would need to be visited. 25 villages were randomly drawn, each with a chance 
of  being chosen that was proportional to its population size. Then, within the 
selected villages, households were randomly selected. Each person in the sector 
had therefore an equal chance of  selection (a “probability proportional to the size 
of  the population”). 
 The sampling was, however, accompanied by terrible uncertainty: All the fig-
ures were calculated as a function of  the figures of  known populations – those 
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calculated based on the population census that dated to 2005. The population 
figures were an estimation of  the evolution, an estimation that derived from the 
assumption of  a continuous demographic growth that is equally significant every 
year (and did not account for migration: See  Box 5.1 on the population census in 
Cameroon in  Chapter 5 ). Now it was necessary to randomly draw villages (clus-
ters) to visit: The census zones provided by the Bureau of  Statistics were entered 
into the ENA 27 software, and the results were impatiently awaited: It was the soft-
ware that designated which villages were to be visited. Eventually, the team left the 
office, got into the Jeeps, and went out into the field. 
 The second stage was to select the households to visit for every village, again, 
randomly: In Adamawa, approximately 16 households were to be selected per vil-
lage. But first, the team had to find the census zones – the territorial survey units. 
Then, in these zones, they had to find the villages. However, the maps furnished 
by the Bucrep were outdated. The names on the map did not always correspond 
to the names used by the inhabitants. There had been departures, arrivals, floods, 
lootings: Certain villages no longer existed – others had been displaced. There 
was a lot of  driving. Adamawa has a total area of  63,701 square kilometers, with 
only 14 inhabitants per square kilometer. There are forests, mountains, bumpy 
roads, and sometimes, no road at all. 
 Once the team finally reached the villages, they knocked on the door of  the 
village chiefs to get a more detailed estimate of  the number of  inhabitants in the 
village, the number of  households, and their geographical placement. Some chiefs 
gave a vague estimate, gave a total population number, or had difficulties in under-
standing what the surveyors mean by “household” (an expert notion that differed 
from common sense notion of  a “family”). Others conversely provided precise 
lists of  the households of  their village – for instance chiefs who had already hosted 
other humanitarian projects in the past. 28 In any case, everything had to be veri-
fied, because some chiefs, wishing to increase their chances of  obtaining food aid 
for their people, may have overestimated the number of  inhabitants. Therefore, 
the team went through the village, knocking on every door, noting the name of  
each head of  the family, counting. One village inhabitant acted as a guide for the 
day – a health care worker, a student, a son of  the chief, etc. 29 
 The counting of  households can take time. The “households” are the basic unit 










all children below 5 , 
1st random drawing 2nd random drawing
 Figure 6.2 Cluster sampling with SMART methodology in Cameroon. 
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a group of  persons who share the same roof ? Who share communal resources? 
Who recognize the authority of  one head of  family? The SMART survey consid-
ered the determining criterion to be the sharing of  food: A household is a group of  
people who, most often, share a cooking pot. 30 That means that the people could 
live on the compound, share one courtyard, without forming a “household.” That 
also means that one can be married and have children together without forming a 
“household.” In a polygamous family, one also has to question the spouses to learn 
whether or not they prepare and consume food separately. For example, let us 
take a plot where one man lives with his four wives and their respective children. 
If  each wife prepares food every day for her own children, four households are 
counted. If, rather, they take turns cooking for all those who live on the land (the 
first wife on Mondays, the second on Tuesdays, etc.), one would count it as one 
single household (that thus includes five adults and all the children). 31 The number 
of  households around a compound were enumerated clockwise, and written on 
the doors with a piece of  chalk: 
 Once the count was complete, 16 households to be visited could finally be ran-
domly selected. Only the 16 selected households would be considered in the sta-
tistical treatment. However, sometimes it was necessary to visit some others out of  
politeness – that of  the village chief  for instance, who requested that his family be 
counted too, or that of  an anxious neighbor, who felt neglected: “Please you must 
come. Why haven’t you come to survey me?” In those cases, those supplementary 
households were surveyed for the sake of  delicacy, but not taken into account in 
the statistics. In the evening, the families to be surveyed were notified: The town 
crier informed the residents: “Don’t go to the fields tomorrow!” 
 The next morning, at 7:00 a.m., the team tackled the heart of  the survey: The 
questionnaire. The team leader asked the mothers: “We are gathering informa-
tion about the members of  the family: How many are present? How many have 
left? How many are dead?” 32 Some questions were considered funny (“What have 
you eaten today?”), others intimate, difficult to respond to in public (“Are you 
currently pregnant?”), others were sorrowful (“Have you recently lost a child?”). 
They frequently switched from language to language: French, Fula, Maka, Badjé. 
The interviewers smiled with their subjects about the local names for foods, and 
they offered comfort for the suffering they had endured and condolences for lost 
children. 
 Finally, the interviewers had to ask about the children’s ages – because the nutri-
tional survey only dealt with children from six months to five years. That could take 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Vulnerability: Impartial algorithms and analog malnutrition 221
time. In Adamawa, half  of  the children had no known birth date. 33 For others, the 
interviewers had to discuss with the mother: When was he born? Before the last 
school vacation? The rainy season or the dry season? They relied on the harvest 
calendar, religious holidays, national events. Each region, each community, each 
village could have a different way of  dating. Some counted. Others placed a peb-
ble in a bowl for each year. They had to agree on the current month: Is it a month 
with 31 days, a farming month, or a lunar month in the year 1435 after Hegira? 
 Then they started on the measurements. They only took a few minutes per 
child, but beforehand, the scale had to be adjusted with a standard weight of  
5 kilograms, the height of  the yardstick verified with the reference stick, and the 
MUAC band’s flexibility verified on a pipe. It is important because all of  these 
instruments deteriorate. The MUAC ribbon folds, it can no longer be extended, 
and it has to be changed every two days. The scale gets decalibrated, and it has to 
be changed every week. On the yardstick, the reading ribbon disintegrates quickly. 
The measurements should always be taken in the same order: First, weight, taken 
twice for the smallest children, unclothed. Then, the arm circumference. Last, 
they measured height: The child lying down for the smallest, standing for the 
largest. That was the most delicate measurement, the one that can frighten the 
children. They started with the bravest children – or with the oldest, even if  they 
are “past the age.” 34 
 The assistant helped the child get positioned correctly, the measurer said the 
measurement out loud: “125 .  .  . no, 127!” The team leader wrote it down. If  
the child had an arm circumference of  less than 125 millimeters, they were suf-
fering from acute malnutrition – less than 115 indicated severe malnutrition (see 
 Chapter 3 on the history of  these thresholds). In that case, they were prescribed 
nutrition supplements ( Plumpy’Sup ) and referred to the health center. It sometimes 
happens, too, that one had to measure children that were outside of  the antici-
pated sample – if  the community liaison remarked, for example, that the child of  
a family next door to the surveyed household seemed to be in a bad way, he was 
measured, he was referred, he was given Plumpy. A nutritional survey is never 
solely a reconnaissance instrument – it is always just as much a humanitarian 
intervention. 
 The day began at 7:00 a.m. Around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., the 16 selected house-
holds had been visited; the supervisor could enter the data into the computer. 35 
The ENA software verified the plausibility of  the numbers: In the table, it under-
lined in red the instances of  figures that seemed surprising and which could be the 
result of  typographical errors: Did the age of  a child exceed 60 months? Did all 
the children in one village have the same weight? Several following arm circum-
ference figures read “0.5”? Everything had to be checked. 36 If  children had been 
absent in the selected households at the time of  the visits, the surveyors returned at 
the end of  the afternoon to take measurements. Then, they collected the material 
and returned to the village chief  to thank him. They paid the guide. Finally, they 
got back into the Jeep and went to the next village to perform the census. 
 In the evening, if  the internet password was working, the supervisor transferred 
the day’s data to the survey coordinator in the regional office. With 10 teams of  
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4 surveyors, they needed 12 days to visit all the villages, to which they needed to 
add days for travel, data entry, etc. The coordinator and the UNICEF consultant 
ultimately calculated that of  the 344 children measured in the Adamawa region, 
20 had a brachial perimeter under the minimum threshold. That put the preva-
lence of  acute malnutrition at 5.8% – that is, for a total population in this region 
estimated at 224,017 children under five years old, a total of  15,233 suffered from 
acute malnutrition. The survey concluded that there was severe and growing acute 
malnutrition in Cameroon, with strong disparities: Less than 1% in a part of  East 
Cameroon, close to 14%, a rate approaching the emergency threshold (15%), in 
the most-affected region, the Far North. 37 
 Needs through the lens of  vulnerability (2): The limits 
of  nutritional surveys 
 The nutritional surveys were far from perfect – a fact of  which those who con-
duct them were well aware. First, there was a strong geographical bias: The 
surveys were only led in regions identified as being in crisis (drought, war, refu-
gees). Thus, no surveys were taken in regions that were not affected by these 
crises (the south and west of  the country). 38 Yet nothing was preventing “pock-
ets of  acute malnutrition” 39 in these regions. Even in the places where food 
was estimated to be sufficient, the prevalence of  acute malnutrition was not 
impossible, because this pathology is also linked to other illnesses (parasites, 
malaria, diarrhea, etc.). There is thus a circular effect created by these surveys: 
The regions that are studied the most are those for which the health indicators 
are bad, but the indicators are only produced for the most studied regions. So, 
paradoxically, it is not solely the nutrition surveys that reveal malnutrition, but 
a combination of  crises. 
 There is also an inverse geographical bias: The most dangerous regions were 
not visited by nutritional surveys like SMART. The departments bordering on 
Nigeria in the Far North region were under threat by Boko Haram and thus often 
excluded from surveys: They remained therefore poorly understood. 40 Yet the 
“blind spots are those in which the situation is the gravest.” 41 
 The second bias was temporal. The nutritional surveys were conducted at a 
specific moment in time (generally September or October for the SMART sur-
vey). But malnutrition is a seasonally dependent pathology. For instance, there 
were “peaks of  malnutrition” in the month of  July, so the integrated health cen-
ters (CNTI and CENA) saw the number of  patients increase at that time. It is the 
end of  the hunger season, the “hunger gap,” the moment when, in the Sahelian 
zone, the granaries are empty. The hunger season begins in May or June and can 
continue until August or September in the North of  Cameroon. But seasonality 
changes according to year (a function of  rainfall) and according to region (the 
millet-growing Sahelian zone and the yam-growing bimodal forest have different 
harvest calendars). The complex causes of  malnutrition (lack of  food, malaria, 
diarrhea, HIV/AIDS, etc.) make it an extremely variable pathology: “Each coun-
try is different, each year is different,” one specialist sums it up. 42 
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 Seasonality makes year-to-year comparison difficult – if, for technical or admin-
istrative reasons, a survey had to be delayed, or pushed up, it became incompara-
ble with the surveys from the previous or following years. It was then impossible to 
know whether the crisis was getting worse, or if  it varied due to seasonal effects. 43 
Acute malnutrition is a pathology that appears and disappears rapidly. Let us 
take the case of  edemas, one of  the principal clinical symptoms of  Kwashior-
kor: A child who has edemas does not have them for long – less than two weeks. 
After that, he either heals or dies. Therefore, “The problem of  edemas is under-
estimated” by nutritional surveys. 44 This is because the surveys only intervene at 
one specific time: “You may very well have done your survey one month before 
the situation deteriorates, thereby missing the problem,” explains one specialist. 45 
 Because of  the biases that weigh on nutritional surveys, specialists insist on the 
importance of  contextual elements to be able to “read” the numbers produced by 
these surveys: The results of  a nutritional survey say little if  one does not cross-
reference them with health-monitoring reports, food security surveys, harvest 
analyses, rains, droughts, health center admissions records, etc. 46 
 Let us take an example: Despite increased humanitarian aid, the rates of  acute 
malnutrition in East Cameroon remained elevated in 2015. What does one do 
with this information? Are certain groups not able to access the aid? Is the distrib-
uted food inadequate? Is it consumed or resold? 47 What are the links between the 
traumas of  war or mental health and food – are some children abandoned by their 
parents? In some groups of  siblings, do some children receive less care compared 
to others? What are the links between nomadism and “abandonment” of  medical 
treatment during migration? What is the connection between malnutrition and 
HIV/AIDS – the prevalence of  which is little-understood 48 – in the region? 
 The biases of  nutritional surveys are well-known to experts. However, they are 
poorly managed, and this becomes all the more acute when drawn from typi-
cal situations (for instance refugee camps). In Cameroon, there were three types 
of  surveys: The survey about Cameroonians in rural areas (the SMART survey, 
conducted by UNICEF) presents a first case: The survey method was sound and 
subject to a fairly wide consensus. Here, it was the diversity of  regional situations 
and places encountered on-site that rendered comparability difficult and gave the 
most important bias. 
 The second, and simplest case, was that of  surveys dealing with refugees living 
in official camps. The methods for these surveys were subject to consensus, and 
there were largely inspired by the SMART method. The refugee sites were the 
best-studied areas, scrutinized by several NGOs (MSF, Première Urgence, Action 
Contre la Faim) that conducted their own surveys, as well as UNICEF and the 
Red Cross. The UNHCR put a specific survey methodology in place for malnutri-
tion, the SENS survey, adapted to refugee camps. The principal advantage of  the 
camp was that it offered experts a panopticon. It allowed comparability in time 
and space. Sites, in spite of  arrivals and departures, gave comparable unities from 
one period to the other, and they concentrated problems thus rendered visible to 
the naked eye: “Even seen at first glance, there was a difference between Gado and 
Timangolo [the latter being in worse health conditions],” a nutritionist recalled. 49 
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In the camps, surveyors could easily access the survey populations. Here, they 
were concentrated and fairly easily identified, and because they were dependent 
on external interventions, often disposed to dedicate time to the surveys – thus, 
the surveyors could allow themselves questionnaires that were sometimes long 
(more than ten pages of  questionnaires for multi-sectorial surveys) and demanded 
an investment of  time from those surveyed. Finally, the random sampling of  the 
populations to be surveyed was made possible by prior census and the administra-
tive grid of  the camps: “Working on the site is ideal, everyone is in place, it is laid 
out well.” 50 
 Finally, the most complex case was that of  surveys about refugees that did 
not live in the camps. This population was poorly understood, poorly surveyed, 
and difficult to access. However it had become strategic for the UNHCR to be 
able to produce numbers on this population. On the global scale – that is, at the 
Geneva headquarters – the UNHCR defended the settling of  refugees outside 
of  refugee camps. Because it had faced severe criticism over the last decade, 
the UN agency now officially pushed for an “alternative to camps.” 51 But on 
the ground, the UNHCR was more and more constrained to give numbers if  it 
did not want to resort to figures produced by its competitors, and we have seen 
how an NGO like MSF could use the numbers it produced for criticism. This 
is why the UNHCR developed its own method of  nutritional survey in recent 
years, the SENS method, which tried to take these questions back into its own 
hands. But the extension of  this method outside of  the sites was found to be 
particularly difficult. 
 In the beginning of  2015, following criticism about its healthcare for refugees in 
Cameroon, UNHCR launched a first large malnutrition survey. This began late, 
one year after the arrival of  the refugees, and what is more, it was limited to Cen-
tral African refugees living in camps. It thus omitted the Nigerian refugees who 
arrived in the north of  the country, as well as Central African refugees dispersed in 
the villages – that is, in total, more than three-quarters of  the refugee population 
in Cameron. 52 A second survey was thus planned, but realizing it turned into a 
nightmare. Endlessly delayed by technical problems, it finally started in November 
2015, was postponed to February 2016, postponed again to August, and finally 
finished in November. In the end, the lag between the two refugee surveys (March 
2015 for the refugees in the camps, November 2016 for the refugees outside of  
the camps) rendered comparison of  the results impossible. By the time the results 
of  the second survey were published, the programming decisions for 2017 had 
already been made several months before, anyway. 53 
 Why such a fiasco? 
 The Cameroonian survey was an innovation for UNHCR: It was the first 
time that an “off-site SENS” 54 survey was conducted. For this grand premiere, 
UNHCR’s ambition was to produce incontestable results: The organization relied 
on a sound methodology – the “on-site SENS” survey – itself  based on the most 
elevated standards – the SMART survey, which acted as a standard value of  nutri-
tional expertise. The UNHCR released 54 million CFA [ca. €82,322]. It mobilized 
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600 volunteers from an NGO that specialized in epidemiology and was well-rooted 
in Cameroon, 55 recruited 25 experienced surveyors from the pool of  the Health 
Ministry, hired the three “focal points” of  the Health Ministry who were specialists 
in nutrition in the affected regions, as well as an outside consultant, a recognized 
expert in nutritional surveys. Finally, it was provided with powerful partners – UN 
agencies, NGOs, ministries 56 – and even the expertise of  the prestigious Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. 57 UNHCR’s reputation was at stake: The orga-
nization had to balance its ambition to coordinate the totality of  the response for 
refugees with its capacity to respond to their needs, including in terms of  medical 
and food aid. However, its competitors believed that UNHCR lacked credibility in 
this areas. As the leader of  one of  the largest donors in Yaoundé put it, “We are not 
financing UNHCR’s SENS survey. UNHCR does not have nutrition expertise.” 58 
 After some months, it became evident that the costs of  the survey were going 
to explode. They would need more surveyors, more vehicles, and more gasoline 
than initially anticipated. They would need to buy more badges, more hats, 
and more survey material, as well as hold more meetings. The SMART team 
sought to survey more than 2000 refugee children. 59 But where to find them? 
They needed to use the same two-stage sampling method as the one used for 
SMART. 
 However, the UNHCR survey not only had to randomly select 2,000 children’s 
names from among the Cameroonian population or draw 2,000 children’s names 
from among the refugees in a camp, but rather had rather to find 2,000 randomly 
selected among the children (under five years old) from the population of  refugees that 
lived in villages. This was much more difficult. They needed to start by making a list 
of  refugees and locating them. However the database that counted the refugees was 
not adapted for a nutritional survey – the tracking of  people was not precise enough 
to allow for random selection. They would have to perform the census by hand: Visit-
ing each village in which there were refugees, and distinguishing, in the heart of  the 
population of  the villages, who is “Cameroonian,” who is a “non-refugee foreigner,” 
and who is a “refugee.” Among this last group, one had to distinguish those who 
were from the “old caseload” (having arrived before 2014), and those who belong to 
the “new caseload” (having arrived since 2014). 60 But how could one recognize the 
refugees? Most could present a ProGres report from 2014, but there were also older 
refugees with papers from 2008, as well as some with biometric papers produced in 
2015 (see  Chapter 5 on registration). The survey team had to drive the hundreds 
of  kilometers along the routes from the East and Adamawa in a Jeep. Sometimes, 
they had to finish on foot, due to impassable roads. The volunteers of  FAIRMED 
Cameroon, a partner NGO of  UNHCR, crisscrossed the villages with a two-sided 
sheet of  paper to which all the possible versions of  refugee papers were pasted: They 
compared these with the papers furnished by the villagers. Certain refugees did not 
yet have papers – they presented “tokens,” these provisional tickets on green or blue 
paper that authorize them to line up for registration. 61 
 The census lasted from November 2015 to January 2016. It produced a data-
base adapted for the survey. The results were judged to be satisfactory, but the 
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surveyors were exhausted. The team took a break, and decided to meet up in 
the month of  February to start the survey. They could not wait too long, or the 
counted persons might have left, to return to Central Africa, to continue on their 
way to a parent, or to migrate. There was a significant number of  nomads, shep-
herds, and itinerant farmers. The rainy season could force people to leave. The 
distance between the census and the survey could degrade the results. 
 When February arrived, the UNHCR team assembled in Bertoua, where the 
survey was supposed to begin. But the surveyors went on strike. They refused 
the offered per diem: The UNHCR proposed 15,000 CFA [ca. €21], whereas 
UNICEF gave 20,000 [ca. €30]! The conditions of  the survey were much harder: 
Data collection that was forecast to last two months (as opposed to 20 days for 
the survey directed by UNICEF) with lodging at one’s own expense in a hotel. 62 
Impossible to work in these conditions: They wanted to negotiate. 
 March arrived: Everyone was unnerved. UNHCR, accused of  incompetence, 
the partner NGO, accused of  mismanaging money, the outside consultant, accused 
of  ignorance about Cameroon, the surveyors, treated like deadbeats. The survey 
was repeatedly said to be starting soon, but it was suspended by decision of  the 
ethics committee – an authoritative body made up of  20 Cameroonian experts 
assembled by the Ministry of  Public Health. The reason was that UNHCR had 
been ambitious: The SENS survey was not a nutritional survey limited to a few 
indicators – like SMART – but rather a complete questionnaire that dealt with acute 
malnutrition, infant nutrition, food security, water, hygiene, mosquito coverings, 
Figure 6.5 Household counting via chalk marking. SENS: UNHCR, Adamawa, August 2016
Source: ©Valentin Gague
Figure 6.6 Interview and questionnaire. SENS; UNHCR; Adamawa, August 2016.
Source: ©Valentin Gague 
Figure 6.7 Interview and questionnaire. SENS; UNHCR; Adamawa, August 2016.
Source: ©Valentin Gague
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etc. 63 One point in particular piqued the attention of  the ethics committee: The 
blood draw that was needed to test for anemia. Outside of  classical anthropometric 
measurements, the survey protocol called for a small pinprick in a child’s finger in 
order to estimate the lack of  iron. 64 However, all blood collection was subject to a 
decision of  the ethics committee. 65 But the ethics committee delayed its meeting. 
It promised to meet soon. But the decision was stalled, then taken up again, and 
negotiated. It would eventually require 250,000 CFA [ca. €381] of  supplementary 
administrative fees – then a kickback of  700,000 CFA [ca. €1067]. 66 
 Finally, the survey began in August. It finished in September, in the middle of  
the rainy season. The vehicles got bogged down, the surveyors walked kilometers 
on foot, and they carried out the measurements under tropical rain. They experi-
enced delays in the delivery of  materials, software problems, and anger from local 
authorities exasperated to have been waiting for several months. One year after 
the beginning of  the census, the survey had exhausted the participants of  whom 
many – including the international consultant and team leader – were quitting the 
project prematurely due to illness. 
 The construction of  consensus: Inequalities as 
a “public secret” 
 As we see, the production of  data about malnutrition is not an easy process, and 
malnutrition experts are the first to acknowledge this. Sometimes, it works nearly 
Figure 6.8  Entering the measures into the smartphone. SENS; UNHCR; Adamawa, August 
2016.
Source: ©Valentin Gague
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according to the plan (as in the case of  SMART), and sometimes it does not (as in 
the case of  the SENS inquiry outside the camps). In all cases, producing data has 
costs in terms of  time, energy, and money. And in all cases, it includes a material 
process that does not take place in ether, but in a muddy and complex environ-
ment. Aid experts are well aware of  this. How is it then that their hesitations and 
their self-criticism about their data are lost in the process of  aggregation? At this 
point, we should return to the notion of  “consensus” discussed in  Chapters 4 
and  5 , and to introduce the notion of  the “public secret” that has been coined 
by Paul W. Geissler. Paradoxically, the focus of  humanitarian experts on “people 
in need” tends to obscure the fact that these people live in the middle of  groups, 
of  communities, of  societies where there are also less-poor people, and even rich 
people. The construction of  a huge statistical category of  “2.7” million people in 
need transforms a power relationship into an ontological property. Inequalities, as 
well as the power relationships that induce them, are well-known to humanitarian 
experts – but they barely appear in the data produced by them. 
 The limits of  the data about needs are well-known to the experts who produce 
them. In their final reports, the survey leaders always include a methodological 
note that constitutes a warning to the reader about the figures offered in the report. 
Likewise, in private conversations on-site, the surveyors and volunteers who pro-
duce the data often express doubts on the quality of  the numbers, showing con-
tradictions and blind spots. However, a whole mass of  information known by the 
members of  the humanitarian community never appears in the overview reports 
on acute needs. The data on vulnerability are purified, selected, and aggregated 
such that they are silent on a whole suite of  information on inequalities. This is 
neither a plot nor a machination. The production of  a “non-knowledge zone” is 
at once well-known by the agents who produce the knowledge and absent from 
the formal reports produced by these agents, as it is constitutive of  humanitarian 
epistemology. 67 
 The principal objective of  the “needs assessment” is to construct a consensus. 
One should remember that methods for needs assessment were often born in con-
texts of  political conflicts, in which numbers were grossly manipulated by political 
and conflicting parties. The great crises that have given rise to the construction of  
new humanitarian knowledge were also wars of  propaganda – the war in Biafra 
(1967–1970), the famine in Ethiopia (1984–1985), the genocide in Cambodia 
(1975–1979), and the genocide in Rwanda (1994). The objective of  humanitarian 
agencies was to construct a space for discussion that was as autonomous as pos-
sible in relation to public opinion dominated by media enterprises and political 
actors. But the price for the autonomy of  humanitarian knowledge was the aban-
donment of  the problem of  inequalities. 
 Why this blind spot? Because the current normative cornerstone of  humanitar-
ian aid is an “ethics of  collaboration.” 68 The normative documents of  which the 
humanitarian experts avail themselves describe a  community of  equals that  collabo-
rate with one another in an  autonomous fashion,  independently and  voluntarily . The cen-
tral idea of  the Humanitarian Charter adopted in 2011 by major organizations 
was that aid relied on a relationship of  equals among the different aid actors .69 
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This document said nothing about the inequalities between North and South, 
between UN agencies and NGOs, donors and operational actors, public and pri-
vate actors, and expatriates and local employees. Power relations were withheld, 
as were economic, social, and cultural differences. The Charter defined the work 
relationships as a  partnership among actors turned together toward a goal estab-
lished by  consensus , a  shared conviction , and  common principles that were  universal . It 
is this fiction of  a consensual collective that constitutes, for the Charter, a  shared 
humanitarian belief . The Charter defined this collective as politically impartial and 
non-partisan. It fostered relationships of   coordination and collaboration with the gov-
ernments of  the nations concerned and with the affected populations. These prin-
ciples of  action also rested on the  transparency of  information that circulates as much 
within the heart of  the humanitarian community as it does toward external actors. 
 The egalitarian fiction can be found at all levels of  humanitarian action. This 
ethics regulated the relation between surveyor and surveyed in Cameroon: The 
“beneficiaries” of  humanitarian aid all participated in the surveys in a “volun-
tary” and “equal” manner. For example, the nutritional surveys ensured an equal 
chance to participate in the survey by means of  a random draw. But in the field, 
the surveyors were in reality ceaselessly negotiating the participation of  this person 
and that. The reason for the presence of  some at the moment of  the survey and 
the absence of  others (nomads in the middle of  migration, or people gone to the 
fields, for example) was not questioned. Likewise, the inequalities among camp 
refugees and village refugees were not questioned, even though they had a strong 
impact on their ability to respond to the long questionnaires of  the SENS survey. 
 The egalitarian fiction was also at play in the relationships among humanitar-
ian workers. There were strong class inequalities between the top and bottom 
of  the humanitarian pyramid, between expatriates and nationals, UN and NGO 
employees, and high-level UNHCR executives and refugees participating in an 
on-site survey for a week. But in humanitarian work, the ideal prevails that every-
one is freely participating in the same collective action. This is why many groups 
of  humanitarian workers were called “volunteers”: United Nations Volunteers, 
Red Cross volunteers, and FAIRMED volunteers, themselves helped by “com-
munity liaisons” (“relais communitaires,” ReCo). Surveyors, mobilizing agents, 
translators, and guides were thus all, in principle, “volunteers” who received no 
salary, but on a case-by-case basis, “indemnities,” “damages,” “per diems,” or 
“defrayments” (reimbursement for transportation, lodging, food, etc.). In practice, 
the “volunteers” perceive – justifiably – these per diems as a kind of  salary – which 
was demonstrated by the frequent demands, work stoppages, and volunteer pro-
tests whenever there was a reduction of  the per diem. 
 Work inequalities continually weigh on the rhythm of  the surveys, their func-
tion, and their quality, and they have a direct influence on the figures produced – 
yet, in the final reports, they are carefully ignored. Of  course, the participants are 
not ignorant that they are working in an unequal society. Each one knows that 
the functionaries employed by the UN agencies and the punctual volunteers do 
not live in the same neighborhoods, drive around in the same vehicles, or eat the 
same food. But the egalitarian fiction is maintained throughout the duration of  
the collective work. When there are communal breaks and meals, they choose a 
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restaurant whose prices are accessible to everyone, they highlight the work accom-
plished in common, and they carefully avoid questions that touch on social status – 
the volunteers put on a good face while remaining silent about their difficulty in 
holding on until the end of  the month, while the expatriates avoid subjects that 
preoccupy them in their normal discussions. 70 
 The construction of  consensus: Pacifying the relations 
between competing organizations 
 The egalitarian fiction is crucial to the relationship between the different insti-
tutional actors. To understand how OCHA calculated humanitarian needs in 
Cameroon, one must understand the diversity of  humanitarian actors (see Fig-
ure 6.9). 
 These actors had contradictory interests. A first fracture line separated the 
Cameroonian state actors on one side, and international organizations and NGOs 
on the other. For example, the government wanted the Central African and Nige-
rian refugees to return to their own country as fast as possible, while the NGOs 
worked toward their local integration. That is why the government grouped refu-
gees in camps (in the North, in the camp of  the Minawao), 71 whereas UN agen-
cies demanded the opening of  a second camp. 72 UN agencies critique national 
governments in a less direct fashion than do NGOs (in particular those, like MSF, 
who consider “advocacy” and “witnessing” as important aspects of  their profes-
sional culture). However even the UN institutions worked more or less voluntarily 
with the government. An agency like UNICEF, which was committed to staying in 
Cameroon for the long term, had more perennial connections with Cameroonian 
administrative services than agencies like OCHA or UNHCR, who arrive in times 
of  crisis and have more distant connections. 73 
UN Agencies in Cameroon in 2016
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women),
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA),
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
World Health Organization (WHO),
World Food Programme (WFP),
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS),
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS),
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Aid agencies in Cameroon in 2016
Figure 6.9 Aid agencies in Cameroon.
Humanitarian NGOs in Cameroon in 2016
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Cameroon Red Cross Society (CRC),
French Red Cross (CRF),
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
Action Contre la Faim (ACF-France),
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA),
Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA),
Care International (CARE),
Afrique Solidarité (ASOL-Suisse),
Catholic Relief Service (CRS),
Counterpart International (COUNTERPART),
FAIRMED (FAIRMED),
Global Health Systems Solutions (GHSS),
Global Viral (GV),
Good Neighbors (GN),
Helen Keller International (HKI),
ICAP-Columbia University (ICAP),
International Emergency and Development Aid Relief (IEDA),
International Medical Corps (IMC),
International Relief and Development (IRD),
InterSOS (INTERSOS),
Johns Hopkins University (JHU),
Management Sciences for Health (MSH),
Médecins Sans Frontières Switzerland (MSF-S),
Plan International Cameroon (PLAN),
Planète Urgence (PU),
Première Urgence Internationale (PU-AMI),
Sightsavers (SIGHTSAVERS),
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV),
Solidarité Internationale (SI),
SOS Village d'Enfants (SOS),
Well Grounded (WG),
Action Locale pour un Développement Participatif et Autogéré (ALDEPA),
Alliance Médicale pour l'Action Internationale (ALIMA),
Alliance des Villes pour le Partenariat (ALVP),
Association Camerounaise pour l'Education Environnementale (ACEEN),
Association Camerounaise pour le Marketing Social (ACMS/PSI),
Association pour la Promotion Humaine dans la Vallée de Logone (SANA Logone),
Cellule d'Appui au Développement Participatif et Intégré (CADEPI),
Centre d'Appui à la Recherche et au Pastoralisme (CARPA),
Centre Optionnel pour la Promotion et la Régénération Economique et 
Sociale-Secteur Afrique (COPRE-SA),
Comité Diocésain pour le Développement (CDD),
Gestion des Terres et des Eaux au Sahel (GTE-Sahel), Green Safe (GS),
Institut des Femmes et Filles Maria Yinda (IFFC),
Organisation pour le Développement Communautaire et l'Assainissement 
du Milieu (ODCAM),
Organisation pour le Développement Rural Intégré (ODRI),
Public Concern (Public Concern),
Solidarités d'Afrique (SdA),
Volunteers Without Borders (VSF)
Figure 6.9 (Continued)
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 A second fracture line separated UN organizations and NGOs. This vertical 
conflict was present in the testimonies of  NGO actors, who chafed under the 
supervision of  UN organizations. In the eastern regions of  Cameroon, for exam-
ple, UNHCR – which was the coordinating organization, the donor for the NGOs, 
and the principal logistical operator, all at once – was the object of  criticism raised 
after the beginning of  the 2014 crisis. Accused by MSF of  having underestimated 
the emergency in May, it was then accused by the Red Cross and Action Contre 
la Faim (ACF) of  neglecting certain refugee sites and not respecting international 
logistical standards (See  Chapter 5 on this point). 74 Insofar as UNHCR was the 
lead, it judged the work of  the NGOs, but as an operator, it is also took part in the 
humanitarian competition for parts of  the market – an ambiguous position that 
irritated other actors. 75 
 Finally, there was a subtler, but still structural, fracture between the actors 
of  the different activity sectors (“urgentists” versus “developmentalists,” aid for 
refugees versus aid for other populations, food aid versus medical care, etc.). 76 
The issue at stake in this horizontal conflict was the procurement of  one part 
of  the “humanitarian market,” 77 that is, one part of  the funds accorded by the 
donors and by private giving, which also implied access to the site, to national 
and international institutions, and to important European and North American 
media. To assert this right to these scarce humanitarian resources, one also has to 
emphasize a specific understanding of  the populations in need. The diagnostic 
adopted justified the mode of  intervention from the outset. In the east of  Camer-
oon in 2014, NGOs were competing for UNHCR funds. The “urgentists” priori-
tized the figures of  acute malnutrition and elevated mortality among refugees to 
legitimize emergency interventions (food distribution, emergency health projects, 
infant nutrition, etc.), whereas the “developmentalists” privileged local integra-
tion, the safeguarding of  local markets, etc. Finally, there were fine distinctions in 
the heart of  each intervention sector that produced conflicts. For example, among 
the “urgentists,” the NGOs specializing in nutrition (like ACF) competed for funds 
with NGOs specializing in food aid (like AHA). 78 
 In this context, the list of  numbers chosen to establish the “humanitarian bal-
ance sheet” of  a country could easily become an object of  conflict – or an object 
of  pacification. This was particularly visible in the way Frank – the OCHA techni-
cian whom we met in the previous chapter – worked. How to construct the map of  
the distribution of  needs in Cameroon? What indicators to choose? What indica-
tors to eliminate? How to combine the indicators in a way in which no organiza-
tion feels neglected? 
 The first step: OCHA gathered the humanitarian organizations in ten sectors 
(food security, nutrition, water/hygiene/sanitation, health, shelter, education, pro-
tection, child protection, sexual violence and hate crimes, early recovery). All the 
organizations that were involved in a particular sector met under the direction 
of  the UN agent who coordinated the sector (UNICEF by the nutrition sector, 
UNHCR for protection, WFP for food, WHO for health, etc.). Then, each sec-
tor chose between three and five indicators that represented the entirely of  the 
problem of  this sector from a list of  possible indicators proposed by OCHA. After 
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many sectorial discussion meetings and meetings with OCHA, each sector took 
up the chosen indicators (percentage of  children suffering from acute malnutri-
tion as related to the population of  the district, percentage of  refugees, percentage 
of  internally displaced persons, percentage of  destroyed schools, unemployment 
rates, percentage of  people in food insecurity, percentage of  homeless people, 
number of  medical consultations per day, etc.). 
 The second step: The indicators needed to be weighted, to be able to com-
pile them and render them visible at the same time on a synthetic map. But to 
which indicators should the most importance be given? How can one compare 
a percentage of   refugees and a percentage of   malnourished children ? Frank, OCHA’s 
data manager, centralized the data furnished by the lead agencies of  each sec-
tor. 79 On his software, the comparison tool for humanitarian needs (which looked 
like a large Excel spreadsheet), he asked each sectorial coordinating organization 
to enter the chosen indicators: UNICEF’s nutrition specialist entered the infant 
mortality rate as the first indicator, the percentage of  children under five suffering 
from severe acute malnutrition as the second, etc. 80 The numbers were entered by 
health district or by department. Frank’s computer (still held together with scotch 
tape) therefore translated all the given figures into indicators normalized from 0 
to 1 (expressed as a percentage of  the maximum score, with 0 for a “normal situ-
ation” and 1 for the most “serious situation”): This normalization permitted the 
sector-by-sector calculation of  a sector’s internal indicators in terms of  an arith-
metic average, 81 for example: 
NutritionIndicator =
(Nutrition Indicator 1 + Nutrition Indicator 2 + ... Nutrition Indicator n)
n
 The third step was the most delicate: To construct a general score for each dis-
trict that represented all the needs of  the entire district population in every sector 
(its  vulnerability ) – and without alienating the humanitarian organizations that were 
involved in the different sectors. Here again, the software program used by Frank 
saved the day: It calculated a general score that was the geographic average of  the 
indicators of  all the sectors: 82 
 
General score =
(Health Indicator * Education Indicator * Nutrition Indicator * Sector n Indicator)
n
 Here, in principle, each sector had an equal part in the general score. This deci-
sion, however, was not the fruit of  research on the relative value of  sectors in pub-
lic health – it was the product of  the explicit decision of  OCHA to create a formal 
equality of  the sectors to avoid conflicts: “in order to avoid potentially long and 
fruitless discussions which could limit the tool’s ability to achieve consensus.” 83 
Herein lies the power of  the algorithm: The production, by way of  mathematical 
averages, of  a consensus between humanitarian actors. The resulting statistics on 
“vulnerability” might be overdetermined by the intrinsic logic of  the humanitar-
ian field. 
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 Conclusion 
 The description of  the production chain of  figures thus invites us to question the 
relationship between the production of  knowledge and internal competition in the 
humanitarian field. 
 First, the “distancing” permitted to humanitarian experts does not signify that 
the face-to-face interactions become less numerous. Contrary to what the liter-
ature on the “data revolution” (including the critical literature) might lead one 
to believe, quantification does not necessarily signify less direct reporting. It is 
often even the opposite. Quantification surveys often lead to new interactions. 
This starts in the headquarters of  organizations: Meetings multiply and people 
visit each other’s offices or in restaurants – including on the subject of  digital or 
immaterial “data” (“have you seen the email from X about Y?”). But the surveys 
also multiply face-to-face interactions on the ground: Interviews with refugees, 
the refugees’ representatives, chiefs, mothers, community liaisons, etc. It would 
be correct to say that the effect of  technologies on face-to-face interactions is not 
neutral. But it would be wrong to think that more quantification necessarily signi-
fies  less face-to-face interactions. These interactions are in fact embedded more 
and more – that is, made possible, but also constrained – by prior calculations. 
For example, in the SMART survey, computer-driven random drawings decided 
which villages in a region would be visited, and thereby which encounters between 
surveyors and villagers could take place. The effect of  the digitalization of  data on 
face-to-face relations is not a zero-sum game. 
 In what way does humanitarian expertise produce specific knowledge (that is, 
knowledge that is distinguished from other forms of  knowledge) about popula-
tions? The salient point of  humanitarian expertise is to treat needs according to a 
general accounting of  suffering. This form of  investigation is extremely efficient in 
that it furnishes at low cost, in brief  periods, and despite difficult working condi-
tions, objective knowledge that is transportable, commensurable, and universaliz-
able. The permanent tour de force that is humanitarian quantification transforms 
human suffering into individual needs, each autonomous and interchangeable. 
 The first consequence of  this mode of  knowledge is an outrageous separation 
between quantitative and qualitative data. The numerical descriptions of  crises 
are the object of  a growing budgetary effort, whereas textual descriptions are 
often excluded. If  standardized methods (like SMART or the ProGres database) 
concentrate on the smooth circulation of  figures on the ground at headquarters 
and on their “rise in globality” by aggregation, the upturn of  qualitative observa-
tions contained in the reports is, on the other hand, travelling much worse – above 
all because they contradict the figures. 84 
 The second consequence of  this way of  understanding suffering is a euphemizing 
of  inequalities and power relationships. The focus on quantifiable “needs” allows 
one to jump directly from individuals to the general population by means of  a statis-
tical aggregate, without having to pass through intermediary institutions, the chiefs, 
 big men , prefects, administrators, entrepreneurs, and all other intermediate positions 
of  power. Humanitarian expertise allows suffering to be seen as a soil-less reality. 
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 This knowledge, however, is not only symbolic: It has real effects on the people 
concerned (effects of  waiting and hope, the promise of  an intervention) as well as 
on the actors engaged in the humanitarian field (a real allocation of  finances, or 
“discharge,” to echo Béatrice Hibou) 85 – which leads us to the question of  power: 
The quantification of  humanitarian needs is never an operation for the sake of  
pure knowledge (if  such a thing even exists). The operations of  knowledge are 
 always linked to interventions. For example, in the case of  registration of  refugees, 
there is an operation at once cognitive and performative. However, it would be 
reductive to see in humanitarian government merely a local variety of  a biopoliti-
cal, neoliberal, or neocolonial power. Certainly, the quantification of  needs con-
tributes to the reification, depoliticization, and naturalization of  needs according 
to the principle of  a universalist ontology. But the humanitarian field still leaves 
room for aid agencies to deploy different strategies. 
 It is, moreover, this uncertainty and this fragility of  the field that seem to be 
one of  the principal issues in the production of  figures: The construction of  a 
humanitarian consensus. This has to do with contributing to the pacification of  
the humanitarian field by producing numbers, all while distinguishing it from the 
political space and the space of  aid beneficiaries. The object of  the evaluation 
of  needs is to limit conflict between humanitarian organizations (in other words, 
to regulate competition among organizations). This happens notably through 
relegating arbitrage to “black boxes” (like OCHA’s magic formula allowing for 
the addition of  indicators). This does not increase the “transparency” of  data, 
because only a handful of  actors really master the complete production chain of  
the indicators of  needs. 
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 12 Skype Interview with Hélène Schwartz and Yvonne Grellety (Nutrition specialists). 
February 2016. 
 13 The 2008 crisis in Cameroon followed an increase in the price of  foodstuffs and gas. 
In February 2008, 14 urban transportation companies organized a significant strike in 
Yaoundé and Douala. The criticism of  the price hike was echoed by political criticism, 
and then, one month later, President Paul Biya had the constitution changed to allow 
himself  a supplementary presidential mandate. The police and army repression of  
the demonstrators led to dozens of  deaths (if  not hundreds, according to some human 
rights organizations). Eboko, Fred. Cameroun: Acteurs et logiques des émeutes de 2008. 
In  Alternatives Sud. Etat des résistances dans le Sud (2008): 53–57.  www.cetri.be/Cameroun-
acteurs-et-logiques-des?lang=fr (Accessed 2017-05-03). The 2008 crisis that affected 
numerous African countries was not a crisis of  the supply disruption but rather a crisis 
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 14 The surveys were linked to different types of  interventions: Surveys on food security led 
to emergency food distribution (baskets of  grain, beans, oil, salt) as well as programs 
aimed at rehabilitation (Food for Work and Food for Training) from the World Food 
Programme, and development (livestock vaccinations, vegetable cultivation assistance, 
etc.) from the FAO. The malnutrition surveys informed interventions in public health, 
with medical care (the distribution of  High-Energy Biscuits and Plumpy’Sup in the case 
of  moderate acute malnutrition, medical care in the nutritional therapeutic centers 
with Plumpy’Nut, and medical follow-up in the case of  severe acute malnutrition). 
 15 Interview with senior staff  member at World Food Programme. World Food Pro-
gramme Headquaters Yaoundé. November 2014 and Interview with Vulnerability and 
Mapping Officer at World Food Programme. World Food Programme Headquaters 
Yaoundé. November 2014. 
 16 Centres de Nutrition Ambulatoires (CNA) and Centres de Nutrition Thérapeutique 
Intensif  (CNTI). 
 17 UNICEF and Ministry of  Public Health.  SMART Nutritional Survey: Final report: 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 . The SMART method is one of  the most widespread 
evaluation methodologies today. It was developed at the beginning of  the 2000s by 
a small group of  North American experts with cooperation from the United States 
(USAID), an American public health institution (the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), a UN agency (UNICEF), and a large NGO (Action Contre la Faim Can-
ada). UNICEF’S SMART coordinators encountered in Cameroon were trained in this 
method by ACF Canada in Dakar. 
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death rate and causes of  death, by a retrospective mortality survey of  the three preced-
ing months). 
 19 It was the SDAM (the Department of  Food and Malnutrition – Sous-direction à 
l’alimentation et à la malnutrition) that piloted the survey, validated the survey protocol, 
recruited the surveyors, and assured the liaison with administrative services (regional 
governors, prefects, mayors, health officials [regional health delegates], and traditional 
chiefs [chefs,  lamidos ]). The implication of  the Ministry of  Public Health at all these 
stages was of  the highest importance for SMART. In contrast, the SENS survey led 
by UNHCR, which maintained more distant ties with the Ministry, had much more 
trouble on the ground. The SMART survey was financed by ECHO, and cost between 
80,000 and 100,000 Euros. 
 20 The surveyors were recruited from a pool of  candidates pre-selected by the Ministry of  
Public Health. The training (questionnaires, anthropometric measurements, database) 
lasted for five days, but most of  the surveyors had undertaken multiple surveys and were 
therefore already experienced in these techniques. There was one survey coordinator 
who worked for UNICEF (a Cameroonian), ten team supervisors (of  which 9 were 
Cameroonians sent by the health administration and 1 was a foreign SMART consul-
tant for UNICEF), and 30 Cameroonian surveyors. There were 15 women and 26 men. 
(UNICEF and Ministry of  Public Health.  SMART Nutritional Survey: Final Report 2015 , 
Appendices.) 
 21 Besides French, the team leaders for the East spoke Fang; those for Adamawa, Gbaya; 
those for the North, Mbum; and those for the Extreme North, Kirdi – all in addition to 
Fula, which is spoken in all regions. 
 22 The ten teams were divided by region (two teams in the East, two in Adamawa, three 
in the North, and three in the Extreme North). 
 23 In reality, the calculations of  sampling were more complex, because they included a 
“cluster effect” that sought statistically to correct the risk of  too-homogenous villages. 
One example of  the calculation of  the sample size: UNICEF and the Ministry of  Pub-
lic Health.  SMART Nutritional Survey: Final report 2015 : 17–18. 
 24 The SMART method used the terms “stratum” to designate the  region to be surveyed, 
“cluster” to designate the  village (or the neighborhood, or the segment of  the neigh-
borhood, according to the researched population), and “household” to designate the 
 families to be studied. This technical terminology was justified by the differences in ana-
lytical units of  the statistical survey and the social units expressed both in administrative 
language (for example, it could happen that one studied a region in two rounds, so in 
two “strata”) and in a common language (for example, a “village” on the statistical plan 
does not necessarily correspond to a “village” in the sense in which the people who live 
there understand it). 
 25 UNICEF and the Ministry of  Public Health.  SMART Nutritional Survey: Final Report 
2015 : 18. 
 26 The Central Bureau of  the Census and Population Studies (BUCREP) in Cameroon 
cut the territory up into “census zones,” which are geographical spaces limited to 700–
1000 persons. A census zone can incorporate several villages (hamlets, neighborhoods). 
 27 Emergency Nutrition Assessment (ENA) was the software developed by Action Contre 
la Faim for the SMART survey. 
 28 The inhabitants of  the east and the north of  Cameroon had long experience with 
development and humanitarian projects. They knew – by reputation, at least – the large 
institutions like HCR, WFP, UNICEF, PLAN, Red Cross, etc. 
 29 The guide received 3,000 CFA [ca.€5] in compensation for his help during the day. 
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 30 The SMART survey’s definition of  a household therefore differed from that of  the 
SENS survey, for which sharing the same roof  was a second determining criterion. 
 31 One can easily see for the interviewees that responding to such questions – that is, ren-
dering public and formalized those rules that are often private and sometimes implicit – 
can bring up sensitive issues. Moreover, the surveyors must often adjudicate, because 
the real-life circumstances of  the sharing or not-sharing of  meals are often far from two 
ideal-typical situations (for example, certain people who live on a particular plot might 
usually take their meals elsewhere). 
 32 These questions correspond to the retrospective mortality survey. 
 33 Date of  birth was known for 48% of  children in Adamawa. This percentage varied 
widely among the regions. See UNICEF and the Ministry of  Public Health.  SMART 
Nutritional Survey: Final report 2015 . 
 34 The presence of  bilateral edemas was also observed. In the UNHCR SENS survey, 
blood was drawn to test for anemia (see later in this chapter). 
 35 There was a double entry: A first entry of  the forms on-site, then a second once they 
have returned to the regional office. 
 36 The ENA software did the first plausibility report after the on-site entry, and a second 
one once all the data were entered, estimating the statistical probability of  the distribu-
tion of  data (for example, the sex ratio). 
 37 UNICEF and the Ministry of  Public Health.  SMART Nutritional Survey: Final Report 
2015 : 33. 
 38 Interview with a Nutritionist at UNICEF. UNICEF Headquarters, Yaoundé. Novem-
ber 2014. 
 39 Skype interview with Hélène Schwartz and Yvonne Grellety, Nutrition specialists 
(authors of  the report “ Evaluation prise en charge de la Malnutrition aigüe au Cameroun ”). Feb-
ruary 2016. 
 40 The fourth SMART survey (2014) thus excluded nine border  arrondissements (districts) in 
the East region. Most of  the surveys excluded the eight arrondissements of  the Extreme 
North that share a border with Nigeria. 
 41 Interview with SMART consultant for UNICEF. UNICEF Headquarters, Yaoundé, 
February 2016. 
 42  Ibid . The consultant estimated that the ideal period for a SMART survey would be the 
beginning of  the hunger season (May/June), but that was impossible given the admin-
istrative plan. 
 43 Thus, the SMART survey from 2012, realized in the post-harvest period, was hardly 
comparable with that of  2013. 
 44 Skype interview with Hélène Schwartz and Yvonne Grellety, nutrition specialists, Feb-
ruary 2016. 
 45 Interview with SMART consultant for UNICEF. UNICEF Headquarters, Yaoundé. 
Interview February 2016. 
 46 This challenge also makes projections for planning the response a delicate issue (the 
“projection of  the caseload” about probable admissions for the years to come). 
 47 Part of  the corn distributed by the World Food Programme was resold by households 
that consumed more manioc. (Crushing and cooking corn has an important cost in 
terms of  time and wood.) 
 48 Screening for HIV/AIDS was done by health services, but certain MSF doctors were 
doubtful about the reliability of  the declared prevalence figures, which were considered 
abnormally low. 
 49 Timangolo had in fact higher rates of  acute malnutrition. Interview with nutrition 
specialist UNICEF. UNICEF Bertoua, March 2016. 
 50  Ibid . 
 51 UNCHR.  Policy on alternatives to camps . UNHCR/HCP/2014/9, 22 July 2014. 
 52 Interview with a Senior Officer at UNHCR Headquarters, Yaoundé, March 2016. 
 53 The UNHCR’s “Country Operational Plan” for 2017 was established in March 2016. 
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 54 UNHCR.  SENS survey on Central African refugees offsite in the regions of  the East, Adamawa, and 
the North of  Cameroon . November 2016. 
 55 FAIRMED, an NGO which has been present in Cameroon since 1959. 
 56 Among the survey partners: UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNFPA, Action Contre la Faim, 
African Humanitarian Aid, International Medical Corps, CARE, French Red Cross. 
 57 One of  the most powerful (American) institutions in the domain of  epidemiology. 
 58 Leader of  one of  the largest international donors, Yaoundé, February 2016. 
 59 In total, 2,622 refugee children were surveyed (UNHCR, SENS survey 2016). 
 60 The “SENS Survey” database was different from the “ProGres” database. For instance, 
the name of  the village indicated in the ProGres database did not always correspond 
to a real village; the refugees could be registered in one village but live in another; 
there were villages that did not exist in the ProGres database, there were non-registered 
refugees, etc. The report modestly stated the “incompatibility” of  the two databases 
(UNHCR, SENS survey 2016: 57). The new database thus distinguished six catego-
ries of  persons: 1. Cameroonians from the visited villages (East, Adamawa, and North 
regions), 2. The previous refugees in the East, 3. The previous refugees in Adamawa, 4. 
The new refugees in the East, 5. The new refugees in Adamawa, and 6. The Nigerian 
refugees in the North of  Cameroon (Minawao Camps). The distinction between “pre-
vious” and “new” was a subject of  discussion. Some experts estimated that the refugees 
(majority Christian) who arrived in 2013 should be placed on the same health program 
as the “new” refugees (majority Muslim), whereas the survey treated them differently. 
 61 Interview with UNHCR Nutrition Officer. UNHCR Headquarters, Yaoundé, March 
2016; Interview with nurse and SMART and SENS surveyor. Regional Hospital of  
Bertoua. March 2016; Interview with SMART and SENS staff  member. Regional Hos-
pital of  Bertoua, March 2016. 
 62 Interview with SMART and SENS staff  member. Regional Hospital of  Bertoua, 
March 2016. 
 63 These items correspond to survey areas that were specialized and partly codified (for 
example, the ANJE module, study of  best practices for the Nutrition of  Infants and 
Young Children (Alimentation du Nourrisson et du Jeune Enfant)). 
 64 A team of  SENS-surveyors thus consisted of  one driver, one team leader, two anthro-
pometric measurers, one interviewer, and one hemoglobin doser. 
 65 On the question of  blood tests in the history of  colonial and postcolonial central Africa, 
see White, 2000. 
 66 A sum reported by two witnesses – one from the Ministry of  Public Health, and the 
other from UNHCR. 
 67 For the concept of  “public secret” and an overview of  works on “non-knowledge” or 
“unknown knowns,” see Geissler, P. Wenzel. Public secrets in public health: Knowing not 
to know while making scientific knowledge.  American Ethnologist 40, no. 1 (2013): 13–34. 
 68 Which is, in part, inspired by the scientific “ethics of  collaboration” described by Geissler 
(Geissler, 2013). 
 69 Sphere Project.  Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response , Third edi-
tion, Geneva: Sphere Project 2011. The “Charter” followed – while being strongly 
distinguished from – preceding charters of  international aid, among others, the “Colo-
nial Development and Welfare Act” (1940) of  the late colonial empire, the collection 
of  bilateral accords from 1960–1980 during the Cold War, and the Red Cross Code of  
Conduct from 1990 and 2000. 
 70 See Geissler, 2013. 
 71 In March 2017, the UNHCR indicated a population of  62,000 inhabitants for the 
Minawao Camp.  http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/settlement.php?id=214&cou
ntry=502&region=73#doc_1 (Accessed 2017-03-10). UNICEF Emergency Coordina-
tor at UNICEF Headquarters. Yaoundé, 2016-02-26. 
 72 To the east, while 70% of  refugees lived outside of  the sites, the mayors and prefects 
criticized NGOs that privileged aid to refugees – at the expense of  Cameroonians. 
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 73 This was apparent from nutritional surveys: UNICEF associated the Ministry of  Public 
Health with different stages of  the SMART survey, whereas the UNHCR conducted 
the SENS survey more autonomously. 
 74 The Sphere standards were not respected by the UNHCR according to participants 
in certain sectors (the WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene). Country Director at 
Action Contre la Faim (ACF). Batouri, 2014-12-05. 
 75 Criticism on the allocation of  funds was omnipresent. At the end of  2014, NGOs 
depending on the UNHCR for funding said that they did not know whether or not 
their projects would be financed for next year. Interview with senior staff  of  the French 
Red Cross in Cameroon. Yaoundé. November 2014. 
 76 Dauvin, Pascal and Siméant, Johanna.  Le travail humanitaire: Les acteurs des ONG, du siège 
au terrain . Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2002: 124–136. 
 77 Carbonnier, 2015: 37–66. 
 78 For nutrition specialists, acute malnutrition is a pathology that requires medical care. 
Nutritional supplements like Plumpy’Sup and F75 milk are considered to be thera-
peutic products to be consumed according to a precise framework. In October and 
November 2014, ACF accused the NGO AHA of  making massive distributions of  
Plumpy’Sup between the sites of  Mbilé and Lolo, outside of  all medical control. Inter-
view with nutritionist doctor at Action Contre le Faim, ACF Headquarters in Camer-
oon, Batouri, December 2014. Interview with an ACF head of  mission, Action Contre 
le Faim (ACF), Batouri, December 2014. Interview with an AHA senior staff, African 
Humanitarian Agency (AHA), Yaoundé, December 2014. 
 79 Interview with an OCHA senior staff, OCHA Headquarters, Yaoundé, March 2016. 
 80 Interview with a nutrition specialist at UNICEF, UNICEF Headquarters, Yaoundé, 
February 2016. 
 81 This addition could be weighted: For example, if  the agency responsible for a sector 
considers one indicator to be more important or more reliable than another, it could 
multiply it by a factor of  its choice. 
 82 Each sector is thus equal in the general score: There was no weighting of  the sector 
indicators to obtain a final score, which was explicitly in order to avoid conflicts of  
interest among the representative organizations of  different sectors (OCHA.  Guidance : 
 Humanitarian needs comparison tool . August 2014: 12). 
 83 OCHA.  Guidance: Humanitarian needs comparison tool . Geneva/ New York 2014: 12. 
 84 SMART survey reports contained, for example, methodological notes that informed 
readers about the conditions of  validity of  the figures put forward. But if  the figures 
themselves were often re-copied and cited, the methodological precautions that accom-
panied them were, by contrast, rarely mentioned. 
 85 Hibou, Béatrice. La ‘décharge,’ nouvel interventionnisme.  Politique africaine 1, no. 73 
(1999): 6–15. 
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